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Contracts
FREDERICK M. HART

§4.1. Introduction. The 1961 Annual Suroey of American Law
pointed to the Uniform Commercial Code as the most significant de·
velopment in the law of contracts during recent years.1 This statute,
with its many provisions affecting the rules of offer and acceptance,
consideration, unconscionable agreements and other aspects of the
contractual relationship, will undoubtedly have a substantial effect
upon traditional contract concepts. At the very least, there has been
a shift from the Willistonian rigidity to Llewellynian flexibility in
contracts involving the sale of personal property. Furthermore, with
the natural tendency of some courts to reason by analogy and apply
the theme of a statute to situations not technically within its scope, the
Code may well have a profound influence upon the supposedly unitary
concepts which are thought to run whenever a contract is in question.
The sections of the Code which depart from prior contract principles have been little tested in litigation, but one such case is discussed
herein.2 It is perhaps the most interesting of the 1962 SURVEY year's
many decisions; unfortunately it is not one of the best. Also noted
are cases on contracts for the sale of real property,s options, 4 the legality of contingent fees 5 and damages where a cost-plus contract is
breached.&
One impression survives the uncertainties of evaluating the cases
reported since the 1961 SURVEY was prepared: 1962 was a year of lost
opportunities. In a number of cases the courts were presented with
interesting issues and the opportunity to improve the law of contracts
both locally and generally. Unfortunately, these cases were lost among
the multitude of insignificant appellate litigation. This prompts the
FllEDEllICK M. HAllT is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a
member of the District of Columbia and New York Ban. He is a recompilation
editor of Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed.). The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance of Edward D. Tarlow in the preparation of this chapter.
1 Collins, 1961 Ann. Surv. American Law, Contracts (1962).
§4.2 infra.
§4.!I infra.
§4.6 infra.
5 See §4.5 infra.
6 See §4.4 infra.
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suggestion, not novel,7 that our jurisprudence might be bettered if the
courts spent less time rationalizing and justifying their decisions in
cases that can be decided by the straight application of established
and recognized principles. More time might then be available for
consideration of the few difficult cases that arise each year.
§4.2. Offer and acceptance: Uniform Commerc;ial Code. An attempted acceptance which varies the terms of an offer has been traditionally treated as inoperative to form a contract. In most cases, courts
have gone a step further and held that the offer expires when such a
response is made, and that the varying· acceptance is a counteroffer
which gives the original offeror the power to conclude a contract by
assenting to its terms.1
The logic of this rule is neat. In practice it usually works well. But
in some contexts it undoubtedly negates the existence of a contract
when the parties intended and believed that enforceable promises had
been exchanged. This may often be true when the transaction involves a sale of goods. In modern mercantile practice the buyer uses
one form - an order or purchase blank - while the seller uses another
- a confirmation form or acknowledgment. On each form are a
number of provisions and, by chance or design, secondary promises
and disclaimers often conflict to some degree. When there is agreement as to the principal terms of the sale, it would appear that the
law should recognize that an enforceable bargain had been struck.
Such was the belief and intent of the Uniform Commercial Code
draftsmen. They attempted to effectuate their thinking in Section
2-207 .2 The degree with which they have achieved this objective was
T "Those courts are wise who make a standard practice of sorting out some proportion of their cases for memorandum opinions, thus mobilizing resources for more
solid effort where more solid effort is more needed." Llewellyn, The Common Law
Tradition !112 (1960).

§4.2. 1 See, e.g., Kehlor Flour Mills Co. v. Lindon & Lindstroem, 230 Maas. 119,
119 N.E. 698 (1918); Saco-Lowell Shops v. Clinton Mills Co., 277 Fed. !149 (1st Cir.
1921).
2 "Section 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
"(I) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates ns an acceptance even though it
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, wiless
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional o:r dilferaat
tt=
.
"(2) The additional terms are to ~ construed as proposals for addition _to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: ·
"(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
"(b) they materially alter it; or
"(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or ia given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
"(!I) Conduct of both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract ia sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not
otherwise establish a contract. In such c-~e the terms of the particular conttact
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of thia Act." G.L,
c. 106, §2·207.
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tested during the 1962 SURVEY year in Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett
&Co. 8

In this case, the plaintiff mailed an order to the defendant for a
drum of emulsion. The defendant sent an acknowledgment of the
order, and subsequently shipped the goods. The acknowledgent bore
on its face in conspicuous type the statement, "All goods sold without
warranty, express or implied and subject to the terms on the reverse
side." On the back of the acknowledgment there were two relevant
provisions:

I. Due to the variable conditions under which these goods may
be transported, stored, handled, or used, Seller hereby expressly
excludes any and all warranties, guaranties, or representations
whatsoever. Buyer assumes risk for results obtained from use of
these goods, whether used alone or in combination with other
products. Seller's liability hereunder shall be limited to the replacement of any goods that materially differ from the Seller's
sample order on the basis of which the order for such goods was
made.
7. This acknowledgment contains all of the terms of this purchase and sale. No one except a duly authorized officer of Seller
may execute or modify contracts. Payment may be made only at
the offices of the Seller. If these terms are not acceptable, Buyer
must so notify Seller at once. 4 .
The plaintiff did not object to this limitation of liability, paid for
the goods in due course and used them. The plaintiff claimed that
the goods were defective and sued for breach of warranty. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict based on the disclaimer was
granted by the district court. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The plaintiff appellant contended that the acknowledgment operated as an acceptance under Section 2-207(1), as the acknowledgment
was not expressly conditioned upon assent by the offeror to the additional provisions therein. The plaintiff also argued that the exculpatory clause constituted a "material alteration" 5 of the original offer
under Section 2-207 (2) and hence could not become a part of the contract unless he expressly agreed to it. Since he had not agreed, the
plaintiff contended that a contract for sale existed and that the implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability set out by the Code& had not
been effectively disclaimed.
Although admitting that the purpose of Section 2-207 was to alleviate the harshness of the principle that a response not precisely in
accord with an offer constituted a rejection and counteroffer, the court
held that the section did not go as far as the plaintiff argued. If the
plaintiff's position were accepted, this, said the court, would lead to
8 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
Id. at 499.
With this the court agreed. Ibid.
6 See G.L., c. 106, §§2-314, 2-315.
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an absurdity as no offeror would assent, after the formation of a contract, to conditions burdensome only upon him:
It would be unrealistic to suppose that when an offeree replies
setting out conditions that would be burdensome only to the
offeror he intended to make an unconditional acc~ptance of the
original offer, leaving it simply to the offeror's good nature
whether he would assume the additional restrictions.'
Having determined what the Code should have done to meet satiafactorily the problem of inconsistent forms, the court still had ta decide the case under Section 2.,207 as it was written and adopted by the
legislature. This presented some difficulty, for it is not easy to reconcile the language of the section with the basic position of the court.
Section 2-207(1) provides that " ... a written confirmation ... operated as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered ... , unless acceptance is expressly made
conditional on assent to the additional or different terms." 8 The
court grasped at the proviso, in effect read out the word "expressly"
and came to the result that wherever a confirmation contains terms
which materially alter the offer the proviso becomes operative and
negates the conclusion that a contract has been formed. Thus the
acknowledgment did not constitute an acceptance but a counteroffer
which was accepted, with all its terms, by the plaintiff when he received and used the goods. Thus the court used Section 2-207 . to
reach the same result as the pre-Code law would dictate.II
The court's interpretation of the section is unfortunate and clearly
contrary to the express wording used by the draftsmen in the section10
and in Comment 2.11 Absent an express condition in the acknowledgment or confirmation, Section 2-207(1) provides that a contract is
formed when the acknowledgment is sent although it contains additional terms. Whether any additional terms become part of this contract depends upon Subsection (2) of Section 2-207.12 Here, absent
assent by the buyer plaintiff, the disclaimer would not be included in
the contract as it materially altered the offer.
v. lF._I?. Bartlett & Co., 29'1 F.2d ,97, 500 (1st Cir. 1962).
for entire text of Section 2-207.
o Note, 3 B.C. Rnd. llc Comm. L. Rev. 57!1, 574 (1962).
to Corman, The ll..aw of Sales Under the llJrn:Iorm Commercial Code, R'7 lR.utgae
IL. lllev. ll4, 25 n.67 (1962): "The <Court is rerening to the !aat phrase in section
2-207(1). However, this phrase does not provide that a response materially altering
the obligation is an acrepmnce conditioned on assent but that a definite seaaonable
<expression of accqmmce operntes as an aa:eptance 'unles3 aa:eptance ia expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or diJlerent terms.' Thua. the attempt
to give the statute a 'practical construction' resulta in a direct violation of the language within §2·207(2)(b)."
11 Comment 2 states in part: "[A]ny additional matter contained in the writing
intended to close the deal or in a later confirmation falls within subsection (2) and
must be regarded as a proposal for an adued term unless the aa:eptance ia made
conditional on the aa:eptance of the additional terms."
12 See note 2 supra for Section 2-207.
T Tiloto-Lith, Ltd.
ll See note 2 supra
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Nor is the Code's position overly harsh on the offeree. He can make
his acceptance expressly conditional upon the assent of the offeror to
the additional terms. If he does not, but instead sends a communica·
tion purporting to be a confirmation of an order, there is no abuse in
giving his communication its common-sense effect.
It is interesting to note that the court entirely neglected the easiest
route to the result it reached. Paragraph 7 18 of the acknowledgment
could easily be held to "expressly condition" the defendant's accept·
ance on assent by the offeror to the additional terms. If the court had
so construed the language of that paragraph, then no contract would
have been formed by the communications and Subsection (3) of Sec·
tion 2-207 H would control. Under the vague language of Subsection
(3) it would seem reasonable to hold that the warranty disclaimer be·
came a part of the contract eventually formed.
§4.3. Sale of real estate: Anticipatory repudiation: Tender. Massachusetts is often cited as one of the very few jurisdictions which refuses to recognize the doctrine of anticipatory breach. 1 The statement
is accurate only when the anticipatory breach rule is defined in the
narrowest way, for the courts of this Commonwealth give relief in
practically all situations which courts of other states might conveniently subsume under this heading.2
Anticipatory repudiation was involved during the 1962 SURVEY year
in the case of La Vallee v. Cataldo.a The plaintiff had agreed to purchase residential real estate from the defendant for $7900. The contract contained a provision which made the agreement inoperative
unless "the seller . . . delivered a written statement issued by the
Federal Housing Commissioner setting forth the appraised value of
the property for mortgage insurance purposes of not less than $7 ,900
. . ." The plaintiff signed the necessary application for an appraisal,
but before the application was processed refused to pay the $20 fee
and told the defendant "that he was not going through with the transaction." In this action, the plaintiff sued for the return of his deposit
of $2000.
The district court held that since the plaintiff had repudiated the
contract, it was unnecessary for the defendant to tender the appraisal
certificate in order to retain the deposit. The Appellate Division and
the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
It is generally said that an anticipatory repudiation enables the
non-repudiatory party to obtain· judgment without performing acts
that would otherwise constitute conditions precedent to his right to
recover.• But it is also generally held that the repudiation does not
affect the requirement that the non-breaching party have the ability
18 Set out in text supported by note 4
H See note 2 supra for Section 2-207.

§4.!I.

1

supra.

Simpson, Contracts §144 (1954).

2 Note, A Century Without Anticipatory Repudiation, !II B.U.L. Rev. 505 (1951}

a !14!1 Mass. !1!12, 178 N.E.2d 484 (1961).
4

4 Corbin, Contracts §977 (1951).
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to perform his obligation under the contract. 11 Thus, if for ~me
reason the non-breaching party could not perform, the repudiator
would be relieved from liability. The burden of showing the nonbreaching party's inability to perform should be on the repudiator.8
Although this involves proof of a negative, in the La Vallee case it
would not be too great a burden since the plaintiff _)lad filed an appli·
cation with the Federal Housing Administration and their decision
would be conclusive.
In the La Vallee case, the defendant's failure to obtain an appraisal
certificate was held to be an "empty gesture" and not essential to the
plaintiff's recovery of the deposit. Several factors support this conclusion. The contract stated that the appraisal was "for mortgage
insurance purposes" 1 and that there was evidence that a bank was
willing to take the plaintiff's mortgage. Also, if the sole purpose of
the condition was to obtain financing, then the repudiation would
negate the reason for its being obtained. 8 Finally, since the plaintiff
did not indicate in his repudiation that he doubted that the certificate
would be issued, the doctrine of estoppel might be used to prevent
him from now raising the question.9
In short, the La Vallee case appears to be within that general class
of cases wherein the seller fails to make a tender, or remove an incumbrance by the time of tender, owing to the anticipatory repudiation of the buyer. In such cases there is generally no question of the
seller's ability to perform the condition if the sale were to go through.
As an example of such cases, La Vallee is of scant import, but it seems
to go a bit further. Here there may have been some question of the
seller's ability to obtain an appraisal certificate as required by the contract. If the plaintiff had successfully proved that the certificate would
not have been issued, he should have. recovered. It might have been
more accurate to assign his failure to prove this inability as the reason
for the denial of recovery rather than simply to characterize the procurement of the certificate as an "empty gesture."
One aspect of the case is disturbing. The plaintiff forfeited a $2000
deposit on property to be sold for $7900. This is more than 25 percent of the purchase price. Although it is possible that the defendant's
damages may have amounted to $2000, this is unlikely. If they did
!llot, then the forfeiture amounts to a penalty.to This question was
lllOt raised by the defendant, and the Court cannot be criticized for
not considering it, but it is unfortunate that the opportunity for clarification of the law in this area was missed. On their face, the. facts
presented an appealing case for limiting the application of the forfeiture dause.11
Jd. §978.
6Cf. ibid.
7 La Vallee v. Cataldo, 34!1 Mass. !1!12, !1!1!1, 178 N.E.2d 484 (1961).
B Cf. de Freitas v. Cote, !142 Mass. 474, 174 N.E.2d !171 (1961).
9 Cf. !IA Corbin, Contracts §762 (1951).
10 Cf. A-Z Servicenter, Inc. v. Segall, !134 Mass. 672, 1!18 N.E.2d 266 (1956).
111955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.6.

II
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§4.4. Cost-plus contracts: Damages. The layman may stand firm
on the principle that his handshake is as good as a detailed contract,
but a lawyer familiar with litigation is forced to wonder and doubt.
The bulk of cases decided during any year in the contract field are
caused by misunderstanding of the rights and duties of the parties,
a poorly drafted agreement, often homemade, or actual lack of agreement at the time of contracting. Most of these problems could have
been avoided if intelligent counsel had been employed at the inception
of the contract.t
One case decided during the past year is striking in this respect. In
White Spot Construction Corp. v. Jet Spray Cooler, Inc.2 the plaintiff
agreed to construct a building for the defendant on a cost-plus basis.
The agreement was sealed by a handshake, and never reduced to writing, nor were any of the details worked out by the parties, each apparently trusting to the other's good faith. The final cost of the
building was not agreed upon, but the plaintiff estimated that it would
cost approximately $150,000, which would include his 10 percent
profit. Later, the plaintiff sent a memorandum to the defendant proposing to erect the building for a total of $156,810, and there was evidence that the cost to the plaintiff would have been $142,000. The
defendant breached the agreement and hired another, who constructed
a building on the premises for a total cost to defendant of $161,000,
$5000 of which was for engineering services.
The plaintiff sued for $14,200, ten percent of the estimated cost to
him. The trial court held that a contract existed, but, in accordance
with an instruction from the judge, only nominal damages were
awarded. On. appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the judgment
was affirmed. In discussing the question of damages the Court said:
Since the recoverable profits would be a percentage of the actual
cost to the contractor of constructing the building, it was essential
for the plaintiff to prove with substantial certainty what that cost
would have been. This it failed to do. All that appears are estimates made by [the plaintiff] at various times. At one time he
estimated that the cost would be $150,000 more or less; at another,
$156,810; and again, that the actual cost of the work would be
$142,000.8
The element of certainty in damages has been explained as "a byproduct of the jury system, springing from the lack of confidence of
American judges in the discretion of juries." 4 The basic element of
the rule of certainty is that the jury must have something more than
guesswork to account for their verdict. To assure this, judges exercise
§4.4. t See 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.1.
1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. ll3l, 183 N.E.2d 719.
1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. at ll34, 183 N.E.2d at 722.
McCormick, Damages 101 (1935), citing John Hetherington &: Sons, Ltd. v.
William Finh Co., 210 Mass. 8, 95 N.E. 961 (1911). This case was heavily relied
upon by the Court in the present case.
2
8
4
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control over the admission of evidence on the question of damages
and, in extreme .cases, remove the issue entirely from the jury's hands.
The harshness that the certainty rule might cause if applied with
vigor has been abated by numerous exceptions or modifications. Emphasis is placed on the certainty of damage, not upon its amount. 15 Less
evidence is required when the difficulty of proof ste~ .from the defendant's act.a Mathematical precision is not the required standard,1 and
the best available evidence, although this provides merely a basis for an
approximation, will often suffice.a
By emphasizing the exceptions to the rule of certainty, the Court
in the White Spot case could have easily come to the opposite result.
Since there was a breach of a bilateral contract, the plaintiff did lose
the benefit of the bargain. Since the contract was a cost-plw agreement, it would seem that a profit 9 would necessarily have resulted had
there been no breach. Thus, it appears that there certainly was
damage. Although the exact amount of loss was not shown, the plaintiff did introduce sufficient evidence to make a jury finding more than
mere speculation. All of his figures, the estimated cost, the proposed
plans and specifications and the cost of the building eventually constructed by another pointed to a loss of approximately $15,000. This
was the best that he could do.
What the Court demanded, however, was that he prove "with substantial certainty" what the cost would have been. This would seem
to be a more rigorous assignment than prior cases have put upon
plaintiffs. The John Hetherington & Sons case,10 quoted by the Court,
speaks of compensation being computed by rational methods "upon
a firm basis of facts" and "a solid foundation of fact." Such language
is meaningless out of context, but the general tenor of White Spot
appears to be toward a stricter application of the certainty test.
§4.5. Illegal bargains: Contingent· fee arrangements. Ambiguity,
if not tergiversation, marks the Massachwetts cases on contingent fee
arrangements entered illlto by attorneys with their clients. In 182!
such agreements were illegal and unenforceable.1 Indeed, their un.,
desirability went so deep as to prevent recovery on a quantum meruit
count for services rendered. 2 However, by 1881, it had been established that the illegality might be painted over by the simple expedient
of providing that a debt to the attorney was to arise for the services

51

ISStory Parchment Co. v. ll'aterson l?ardlment Paper Co.• 282 U.S. 555,
Sup.
Ct. 248. 75 JL. Ed. 544 (1931). See Note, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 121 (1947).
e McCormick, Damages 102 (1935).
'1 Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 212 Mas.,. 352, 99 N.E. 221 (1912).
8 See Orbach v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 233 Mas.,. 281, 12!1 N.E. 669 (1919).
9 Whether the entire 10 percent would constitute ""profit" is open to question.
10 John Hetherington & Sons, Ltd. v. William Firth Co., 210 Mass. 8, 95 N.E. 961
(1911).
·
§45. 1 Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415 (Mass. 1825).
21bid.
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even if the cause were lost.a This debt, it has b:!en held, must be other
than an obligation to pay expenses,• but it is doubtful whether it need
be more than a formality.11
Most lawyers probably find little difficulty staying within the framework of legal contingent fee arrangements. Nor is there likely to be
any feeling of guilt over walking close to the borders of champerty.
The Supreme Judicial Court has approved their tightrope acts, and in
most jurisdictions the very problem is non-existent. 6 Occasionally,
however, a lawyer through carelessness, unfamiliarity with this idiosyncrasy of Massachusetts law or a misapprehension of prior cases finds
himself in litigation with his client as to the collectability of a fee.
Under rather unusual circumstances this issue reached the Supreme
Judicial Court during the 1962 SURVEY year in Sullivan v. Goulette.1
The defendant, administratrix of an estate, hired the plaintiff to
prosecute a wrongful death action of her intestate. The attorney's
fee was to be a percentage of the recovery: if there were no recovery,
there would be no compensation. The plaintiff was successful in the
action and he filed a claim against the estate for the agreed percentage.
The probate judge recognized the contingent nature of the arrange~
ment but held that there was an implied condition that the contract
was subject to the approval of the Probate Court. This, in his opinion, was sufficient to take the case out of the category of illegal champertous fee contracts.a The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on the
same narrow grounds, refusing to reconsider the legality of contingent
fee contracts in general.9
An extended exploration of the problems of contingent fee contracts
with emphasis on the Massachusetts position has been recently published elsewhere, 10 and any attempt to treat the basic and broad issues
here would be futile. A few comments on the Sullivan opinion, however, are appropriate. It is difficult to see any true distinction between
the fee arrangement in this case and those that have been held chama Ackert v. Barker, 131 Mass. 436 (1881). See also Blaisdell v. Ahem, 144 Mass.
393, 11 N.E. 681 (1887).
• Holdsworth v. Healey, 249 Mass. 436, 144 N.E. 386 (1923).
5 See Blaisdell v. Ahem, 144 Mass. 393, 11 N.E. 681 (1887); Radin, Contingent
Fees, 28 Calif. L. Rev. 587, 589 (1940); Note, 41 Cornell L.Q. 683, 687 (1956).
6 Apparently only Massachusetts and Maine question contingent fees. See Comment, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 329, 336 nn.44-47 (1959).
T 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 743, 182 N.E.2d 519. See also §22.11 inf,·a.
8 The probate judge did, however, disallow part of the claim. 1962 Mass. Adv.
Sh. at 744, 182 N.E.2d at 522.
9 "It may be that the subject [of contingent fees] should be dealt with by appropriate court rules. For the decision of the present case, however, it is sufficient
to say that we are of opinion that, in the circumstances, the principles set forth in
the earlier cases should not preclude payment of fair and reasonable compensation
to [the attorney]. In reaching this conclusion, we give special weight to the fact that
the compensation to be paid is subject to the approval of the Probate Court. We
perceive no considerations of public policy which require denial of all compensation." 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 747, 182 N.E.2d at 523.
10 Hughes, The Contingent Fee Contract in Massachusetts, 43 B.U.L. Rev. l (1963).
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pertous in earlier decisions. Nor does the fact that the Probate Court
has the power to disapprove the amount of recovery seem to mark
a valid line of distinction. All courts have such power, and it is inconceivable that they would be closed to a suit testing the amount of
a fee in a non-death action. Also, it is not the amount of the fee that
under prior decisions made the contract champertqus; it was the fact
that the amount depended solely on the outcome of the case.
The effect of the Sullivan case on the practices of the local bar in
accepting cases on what are in fact contingent fees is easy to predict.
It will be nil. For those interested in discovering what the "law" of
contingent fees might be in this jurisdiction, the Sullivan case adds
more confusion than light. There is a suggestion11 at one point that
the Blaisdell v. Ahern 12 escape hatch has been too broadly interpreted.
On the other hand, the general tenor of the opinion, and even the
simple fact that it was considered by the Court, may furnish some encouragement to the next lawyer who falls into the contingent fee trap.
§4.6. Options: Termination. The 1961 SuRVEY 1 discussed at some
length a case holding that an option expired before it was exercised
when the notice of election was mailed before but arrived after the
final day of the option. During the past year another decision, C. b
W. Dyeing and Cleaning Co. v. De Quattro,2 emphasized the rule
that an option holder must perform strictly in accord with the agreement in order to preserve his rights. In this case the plaintiff was the
assignee of a lease. The agreement provided:
The Lessor agrees that if the Lessee within five years . . . shall
give to the Lessor two months notice in writing that he desires to
purchase the premises . . .· for the sum of $23,000.00, the Lessor
on or before the expiration of such notice will convey . , . the
premises . . . the said $23,000.00 · to be payable as follows:
$5,000.00 in cash and $18,000.00 by a promissory note . . .a
The five-year period expired on September I.· On June 24 the
notice of an election to exercise the option was given, but on August
22 the plaintiff informed the defendant that he was unable to raise
the down payment, and he asked for an extension, which was denied.
Another such request was made and refused on the next day. On
August 31, the plaintiff informed the defendant that he believed he
could have the cash available on the next day, and on the lst of September the plaintiff offered to pay the $5000, but this was refused.. The
trial court found as a fact that the plaintiff, in spite of his offer, was
actually unable to pay the agreed price on September I. The plain11
12

1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 74!1, 745, 182 N.E.2d 519, 522.
144 Mass. !19!1, II N.E. 681 (1887).

§4.6. I 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.4, discussing Cities Service Oil C.O. v. Na·
tional Shawmut Bank, !142 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104 (1961).
2 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1257, 184 N.E.2d 61.
a 1962 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1258, 184 N.E.2d at 62·6!1.
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tiff's bill in equity for specific performance was dismissed and this
decree was affirmed on appeal.
The plaintiff argued that a bilateral contract for the sale of the
premises was formed when he exercised the option on June 24 and
that, in equity, time is not of the essence in a contract to convey land.
The Court accepted the position that the contract came into existence
when the notice was given, but held that the general equity rule was
not applicable. From the language of the option and the construction
placed upon it by the parties, the Court found an intent that the sale
was to be consummated within the five-year period. Since the plaintiff was unable to pay the down payment on September l, the defendant was under no obligation.
The Court's decision rests upon its interpretation of the option
agreement. The general rule, that time is not of the essence, should
prevail in the absence of a contrary intent of the parties shown in
their agreement. 4 The position of the Court is amply supported as
the option agreement states, in effect, two conditions to the plaintiff's
right to a conveyance: (1) notice and (2) tender of $5000 within two
months thereafter. The necessity of the tender within two months
can be inferred by the promise of the defendant to convey within two
months after receiving notice. Since the conveyance and payment are
concurrent conditions, the tender must be made within the same
period of time.
4

1 Corbin, Contracts §27!1 (1950).

